The problem of schema or ontology matching is to define mappings among schema or ontology elements. Such mappings are typically defined between two schemas or two ontologies at a time. Ideally, using the defined mappings, one would be able to issue a single query that will be rewritten automatically to all the databases, instead of manually writing a query to each database. In a centrally mediated architecture a query is written in terms of a global schema or ontology that integrates all the database schemas or ontologies, while in a peer-to-peer architecture a query is written in terms of the schema or of the ontology of any of the peer databases.
vening parties. Most importantly, from a privacy-preserving viewpoint, we do not use a third-party mediator and only those schema attributes that are matched are revealed by a party to the other party.
Our approach to privacy-preserving schema matching is based on the instance-based schema matching approach by Kang and Naughton [6] , which considers the dependencies among data instances, as measured by the mutual information among every pair of attributes in each schema. For each schema, these dependencies are represented as a weighted graph and matching between the two schemas relies on matching the corresponding graphs. The mutual information between two attributes is a measure of the amount of information that each attribute contains about the other attribute. Mutual information can be computed using the entropies of the individual attributes and the conditional entropies. We consider three types of mappings: one-to-one, onto, and partial.
We develop an efficient privacy-preserving schema matching protocol using mutual information of pair-wise attributes. The protocol is executed by two entities, each having a private schema. The output of the protocol is a set of mappings between the matching attributes of the two schemas. We prove that our privacy-preserving schema matching protocol is secure against malicious adversaries for all mapping types. One of the building blocks of our protocol is the privacy-preserving set intersection scheme by Freedman, Nissim, and Pinkas [5] . We show that in the case where all the attribute entropies in one of the schemas are different from one another, the protocol executes a linear number of privacy-preserving set intersections.
